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FINDING A CURE FOR HIGH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
PREMIUMS: THE LIMITS OF MISSOURI’S DAMAGE CAP AND 
THE NEED FOR REGULATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I’m here to talk about how we need to fix a broken medical liability 
system. . . .  I’m here to . . . say as clearly as I can, the United States Congress 
needs to pass real medical liability reform this year. 
What’s happening all across this country is that lawyers are filing baseless 
suits against hospitals and doctors.  That’s just a plain fact.  And they’re doing 
it for a simple reason.  They know the medical liability system is tilted in their 
favor.  Jury awards in medical liability cases have skyrocketed in recent years.  
That means every claim filed by a personal injury lawyer brings the chance of 
a huge payoff or a profitable settlement out of court. 
This liability system of ours is . . . out of control.  And you people in this area 
and the doctors in this area understand what I’m talking about. 1 
On January 5, 2005, President Bush spoke these words to a crowd in 
Madison County, Illinois, just miles from downtown St. Louis.  The 
President’s speech fueled an already heated debate over the high price of 
medical malpractice insurance premiums.  The President blamed “junk 
lawsuits,” “big jury verdicts,” and an “out of control” liability system for 
driving up the price of physicians’ premiums.2  According to the President, 
physicians faced with high medical malpractice premiums have few choices—
they can pass the costs onto patients, move to a state with lower premiums, or 
quit practicing in their field. 3  As a result, the President warned that high 
 
 1. President George W. Bush, Address at the Gateway Center, Collinsville, Illinois (Jan. 5, 
2005) [hereinafter President Bush Address] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/01/20050105-4.html). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  Reimbursements for medical services from sources such as Medicare, Medicaid, and 
managed health care plans often prevent physicians from increasing the price of their services, 
and the option of passing on the cost of increased premiums to patients may not be available.  
MO. DEP’T OF INS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN MISSOURI: THE CURRENT 
DIFFICULTIES IN PERSPECTIVE 31 (2003) [hereinafter MDI 2002 REPORT]. 
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medical malpractice premiums hurt not only physicians—but all Americans—
by making health care less affordable and available.4 
To lower and stabilize medical malpractice premiums, the President urged 
Congress to pass medical liability reform.5  The centerpiece of the President’s 
plan is a nationwide cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
lawsuits.6  Non-economic damages are usually awarded for a plaintiff’s pain 
and suffering,7 and are already subject to caps in nineteen states.8  Most 
Republicans, physician groups, and insurance companies support a cap on non-
economic damages.9  Like the President, they believe that caps lower costs for 
 
 4. President Bush Address, supra note 1.  However, a recent report by the Congressional 
Budget Office showed that malpractice costs represented less than two percent of overall health 
care spending.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
6 (2004), available at: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf. 
 5. President Bush Address, supra note 1.  The President’s plan was passed by the House of 
Representatives and is pending a vote in the Senate.  Patients First Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th 
Cong. (2003); S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 6. H.R. 5.  The cap on non-economic damages is set at $250,000.  Id.  In addition to the 
cap, awards for future non-economic damages would not be discounted to present value.  Id.  The 
bill also does away with joint liability, thus, each tortfeasor’s liability would be limited to 
his/her/its several share of any damages only, and not include the share of any other person.  Id.  
The bill also limits punitive damages and an attorney’s entitlement to contingent fees in a medical 
malpractice liability lawsuit.  Id. 
 7. In Missouri and most jurisdictions, non-economic damages are one of three types of 
damages a plaintiff may recover.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.  Non-economic damages 
compensate the victim or family for loss in the quality of life from the injury.  “These damages 
may cover a patient’s pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, inability to engage in usual 
activities, emotional distress, disfigurement and mental anguish of survivors or disruption of 
family in wrongful death cases.” Id.  Most awards in Missouri are in the form of economic 
damages.  Id.  Economic damages include “the cost of medical treatment needed for the negligent 
injury and the loss of earnings that resulted.”  Id.  Punitive damages are the third and rarest type 
of damages awarded.  Punitive damages are awarded against providers for willful misconduct.  Id.  
Such damages are strictly limited under Missouri law and are not covered by malpractice 
insurance.  Id. 
 8. Other states with non-economic damage caps include Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Adam D. Glassman, The 
Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current 
Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 433–58 (2004). 
 9. Id. at 419.  According to a recent survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and 
the Harvard School of Public Health, the public favors reducing jury awards in malpractice 
lawsuits but ranks it relatively low on the list of health care priorities.  News Release, Kaiser 
Family Foundation, Americans Favor Malpractice Reform and Drug Importation, But Rank Them 
Low on Health Priority List for the Congress and President (Jan. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/pomr011105nr.cfm.  Sixty-three percent of Americans favored 
caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.  Id.  But only twenty-six percent 
of the public cited reducing malpractice jury awards as a top priority for the President and 
Congress, ranking it eleventh on the list.  Id. 
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insurers by reducing malpractice claims, damages payouts, and insurer 
uncertainty.10  The savings from a cap can then be passed onto physicians as 
lower premiums.11 
Across the Mississippi River from the President’s speech, the debate over 
medical malpractice reform in Missouri has intensified.  Medical malpractice 
premiums hit record highs in 2002 and 2003, despite Missouri’s damage cap, 
which was enacted in 1986.12  The rapid increase in the price of premiums has 
sparked new movements for reform.  Supporters of Missouri’s cap argue that it 
is too weak and seek to tighten it in two ways.13  First, they seek to overrule 
recent Missouri court decisions allowing multiple caps in a single case.14  
Second, they hope to lower the cap amount and eliminate the yearly increase 
for inflation.15  By tightening the cap, they hope it will provide greater savings 
for insurers, and insurers will then pass the savings on as lower premiums. 
But despite these movements for reform, experts and data suggest that a 
cap is too limited of a solution, “more symbolic than substantive” in 
 
 10. See President Bush Address, supra note 1; Glassman, supra note 8, at 419–20. 
 11. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 8:31 (3d ed. 1997). 
 12. See infra Part II.B; MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Matt Blunt, A Prescription for Missouri, 101 MO. MED. 440–41 (2004) (calling 
for the reform of Missouri’s cap by eliminating multiple caps and lowering the cap amount).  
Executive vice president of the Missouri State Medical Association (MSMA), C.C. Swarens, 
believes that “an effective cap that’s enforced and not expanded” is the “‘key ingredient’ to stable 
premiums.”  John Carroll, Are New Liability Caps Working?, MANAGED CARE, Feb. 2003, at 15–
16, available at www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0302/0302.regulation.html. 
 14. Blunt, supra note 13, at 441. Under recent judicial decisions interpreting Missouri’s 
damage cap statute, a plaintiff may recover damages equal to multiple cap amounts if there are 
multiple defendants, plaintiffs, or occurrences of negligence.  Before these decisions, Missouri’s 
damage cap, which was $565,000 in 2004, was the most plaintiffs could recover for non-
economic damages in a medical malpractice lawsuit.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
  Multiple damage caps has become a “hot-button issue for Missouri physicians and 
malpractice insurers, who claim the uncertainty spawned . . . has helped fuel a medical liability 
crisis, led to escalating malpractice premiums, and caused doctors and malpractice insurers to flee 
the state.”  Dan Margolies, Undeterred, Tort Reformers Will Return to Capitol, KAN. CITY STAR, 
Sept. 21, 2004, at D25.  According to the past president of the Missouri Organization of Defense 
Lawyers (MODL), Lisa Weixelman, multiple caps substantially increased physicians’ exposure, 
and “[t]he direct outcome [is] on their malpractice premiums.  [Multiple caps are the reason] why 
tort reform is really needed and why it needs to be done legislatively at this point in time.”  Dan 
Margolies, Missouri Court Further Limits Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 
KAN. CITY STAR, July 28, 2004, at C1.  According to the Missouri Hospital Association,  “[a] top 
priority should be to reverse [multiple cap decisions] and restore a single cap on noneconomic 
damages per episode of care . . . .  This should result in reduced uncertainty for insurers, which in 
turn would help stabilize the market.”  Jennifer Bethurem, Malpractice Insurance Costs Threaten 
Access to Care, INSIDE CONNECTION, Spring 2004, at 3 (publication of the Missouri Hospital 
Association). 
 15. Blunt, supra note 13, at 441; see also Carroll, supra note 13, at 16; Bethurem, supra note 
14, at 3. 
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controlling malpractice premiums.16  According to Bill Turley, an insurance 
industry executive involved in Missouri’s tort reform efforts in the 1980s, 
“[f]ocusing on noneconomic damages is a search for ‘a magic bullet’ that 
misses the larger target.”17  Data from the Missouri Department of Insurance 
(MDI) supports his claim.18  Contrary to the President’s rhetoric of an “out of 
control” liability system, few cases reach the cap limit in Missouri, and the 
number is declining.  In 2003, only five cases were limited by the cap, down 
from thirteen in 2002.19  Moreover, these cases were hardly “junk lawsuits”—
they typically involved severe injuries, such as quadriplegia or severe brain 
damage, with terminal diagnosis or the need for lifetime care.20  While few 
cases reach the cap limit, most awards remain far below the cap amount.  In 
2003, Missouri’s cap was $557,000, but the average non-economic damage 
award was only $85,140, and the median or typical award was even lower, 
$27,872, only five percent of the cap amount.21  Moreover, Missouri’s damage 
cap limits only non-economic damages, such as for pain and suffering.22  But 
economic damages, for medical expenses and lost wages, are the largest part of 
the average medical malpractice award and remain unlimited under Missouri 
law.23  Perhaps most obvious, a cap on damages does not require insurers to 
pass any savings onto physicians as lower premiums.  In Missouri, claims filed 
 
 16. Paul Wenske & Julius A. Karash, Caps and Damages, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 11, 2005, 
at D1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. MDI reports data that is filed and reported by insurers themselves. See discussion infra 
Part III.A. 
 19. Press Release, Missouri Department of Insurance, MDI Report: Limiting Malpractice 
Data to Insurers Yields Same Result—17-Year Lows on Claims Filed, Paid (Apr. 27, 2004), 
available at  http://www.insurance.state.mo.us/cgi-bin/news/ news2.cgi?newsid=EplFpAkZulIq 
OYcjhO [hereinafter MDI Press Release, Apr. 27, 2004]. 
 20. According to MDI, “the severity of the claims receiving judgments equal to the Missouri 
caps averages a 7 or 8—permanent injury like quadriplegia, blindness, severe brain damage 
requiring lifetime care or terminal diagnosis.”  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.  This 
ranking of “7 or 8” is on a 1 to 9 scale, with 9 being death.  Id. at 17. 
 21. MO. DEP’T OF INS., 2003 MISSOURI MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT 
(2004), available at  http://www.insurance.state.mo.gov/reports/medmal/index.pdf,  
http://www.insurance.state.mo.gov/reports/2003medmal/2003medmalfinancial.htm & 
http://www.insurance.state.mo.us/reports/2003medmal/2003medmal.htm [hereinafter MDI 2003 
REPORT].  Only thirteen awards exceeded $1 million in 2003, and only three exceeded $2 million.  
Id.  Most the damages in these cases were economic damages, not covered by Missouri’s damage 
cap.  Id. 
 22. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 23. Id.  Non-economic damages consisted of just forty-one percent of the average medical 
malpractice award in 2003 (dividing $85,140 by $207,068).  Id.  Only seven states have caps on 
all damages, including economic: Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, South 
Dakota and Virginia.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.  Kansas passed a cap on total 
damages, but it was held unconstitutional. Id.; see Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 
757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988). 
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and paid reached record lows in 2003, and malpractice insurers’ cash-flow 
ratio,24 the percentage of premium paid on claims, was the lowest since 1994, 
yielding a cash-flow windfall for insurers.25  But despite these profitable 
indicators, premiums remained high in 2003.26  Without market competition or 
state regulation, insurers can keep premiums high and any profits that result.27 
Reform of Missouri’s damage cap is practically certain, regardless of 
whether Congress passes President Bush’s proposal.  For the first time in 
eighty-four years, Missouri is controlled by a Republican Governor and 
Republican majorities in both legislative houses.28  In the 2004 election, 
Governor Matt Blunt made achieving low, stable medical malpractice 
premiums through medical liability reform a priority.29  But the question 
remains: what kind of reform will cure Missouri’s high medical malpractice 
premiums?  This is the subject of this article. 
This Comment examines the history of Missouri’s damage cap and the 
judicial decisions allowing multiple caps.  Then, it evaluates proposals to 
tighten Missouri’s cap by eliminating multiple caps and lowering the cap 
amount.  This Comment concludes that these proposals provide only minimal 
savings for insurers and will not necessarily result in lower premiums unless 
MDI is given more power to regulate premiums. 
 
 24. The cash flow ratio is equal to actual losses paid divided by premium written in a given 
year.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21.  Actual losses paid are all claim payments made during 
the year, regardless of when the claims were filed.  Id.  Premium written is the amount charged 
when a policyholder contracts for insurance coverage and includes projected revenues from 
policies written during the year.  Id.  The cash flow ratio is different from the loss ratio, discussed 
infra and at note 32, in that the loss ratio is equal to “losses incurred,” which includes estimated 
losses on new claims, divided by “premium earned,” which is revenues received from those parts 
of policies lapsing during the year.  Id. 
 25. The cash-flow ratio was approximately forty-five percent in 2003.  Id.  This means that 
for every dollar of premium collected, insurers paid out only forty-five cents on malpractice 
claims.  Id.  By comparison, the cash-flow ratio was approximately sixty-three percent in 2002, 
and the average over the past ten years was sixty-two percent.  Id. 
 26. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 27. For a discussion regarding the lack of competition and regulation of Missouri’s medical 
malpractice insurance market, see infra Part III.B.3.  Five insurers provide eighty-three percent of 
malpractice coverage for Missouri physicians (dividing $112,296,943 by $135,743,399).  MDI 
2003 REPORT, supra note 21.  Only three insurers are writing new policies.  MDI 2002 REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 7.  A recommendation for strengthening the regulatory power of the Missouri 
Department of Insurance is discussed infra Part III.C. 
 28. Missouri Legislature: A New Season, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 2005, at B6. 
“It is all but certain that Mr. Blunt and the Legislature will accomplish . . . caps on damages for 
pain and suffering in medical malpractice lawsuits.”  Id.  “But the $250,000 limit proposed by the 
GOP is too low. . . .  To balance the need for affordable insurance against justice for victims, we 
might look to the . . . cap that existed in Missouri before it was weakened by court decisions.”  Id. 
 29. Blunt, supra note 13, at 441. 
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II.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory History of Missouri’s Damage Cap 
In 1986, Missouri enacted a statutory cap on non-economic damages in 
response to an increase in medical malpractice claims and insurance pricing 
problems.30  In 1986, overall claims hit a high of nearly 2100, tripling from 
695 in 1979. 31  The loss ratio, or percentage of premiums estimated to be paid 
on claims, reached a record high for medical malpractice insurers.32  In 1984, 
the loss ratio for medical malpractice insurance was 136%.33  Hospitals had 
posted a 188.1% figure in 1984, while physicians reached an all-time high of 
131% in 1981.34  By comparison, the loss ratio was 81% overall and 61% for 
physicians in 2001.35 
Missouri’s damage cap was a product of a task force including health-care 
providers, health-care insurers, and attorneys representing both plaintiffs and 
defendants.36  The task force made several proposals in response to the high 
medical malpractice premiums, including a cap on non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice lawsuits.37  The cap was approved by the legislature in 
Senate Bill 663.38  The statute provides: 
In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or 
death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care 
 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000); MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. 
 31. MDI 2002, supra note 3, at 12.  Overall claims filed include claims against hospitals, 
physicians, and other health care providers.  Id. 
 32. Insurers’ loss ratio is equal to incurred losses divided by earned premium.  MDI 2003 
REPORT, supra note 21.  Incurred losses are estimates by insurers of their liability for payouts on 
claims filed during the year, projected future payments for such claims, and revised payments and 
projections for claims filed in previous years.  Id.  Earned premium includes revenues from those 
parts of policies lapsed during the year.  Id.  Loss ratios differ from cash flow ratios by including 
insurers’ estimated projections on future payments, as calculated in their incurred losses.  Id.  
Thus, when the loss ratio is fifty percent, insurers estimate that only fifty cents will be paid out or 
reserved for future payment for every one dollar in premiums earned.  Id. 
 33. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Bruce Keplinger, Multiple Damage Caps for Claims Against Health Care Providers, 60 
J. MO. B. 116, 116 (2004). 
 37. Id. 
 38. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.  The 1986 bill also required: a showing of 
“willful, wanton or malicious” misconduct for punitive damages; plaintiffs to file an affidavit of 
merit for each defendant; defendants to be jointly liable only with other defendants whose fault 
was equal to or less than his or her own; physicians on staff at a hospital in populated counties to 
maintain at least $500,000 in medical malpractice insurance; hospitals and outpatient surgical 
centers to report disciplinary actions against providers to state licensing boards; insurers and self-
insured providers to report claims information to MDI, which forwards the information to 
licensing boards.  Id. 
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services, no plaintiff shall recover more than [$350,000]39 per occurrence for 
noneconomic damages from any one defendant as defendant is defined in 
Subsection 2 of this section.40 
B. The Cap’s Purpose: Reduce Medical Malpractice Premiums and Health 
Care Costs41 
The purpose of Missouri’s cap was described in Adams v. Children’s 
Mercy Hospital.42  In Adams, the Missouri Supreme Court held the cap was 
constitutional because it was rationally related to the state interest of ensuring 
public health and maintaining affordable health care costs.43  According to the 
court: 
The legislature could rationally believe that the cap on non-economic damages 
would work to reduce in the aggregate the amount of damage awards for 
medical malpractice and, thereby, reduce malpractice insurance premiums paid 
by health care providers.  Were this to result, the legislature could reason, 
physicians would be willing to continue “high risk” medical practices in 
Missouri and provide quality medical services at a less expensive level than 
would otherwise be the case.44 
To understand how a damage cap impacts malpractice premiums, a general 
discussion of how insurers calculate premiums is necessary.  Insurers set 
premiums using actuarial techniques to generate funds for: “(1) losses 
occurring during the period, (2) the administrative costs of running the 
company, and (3) an amount for unknown contingencies, which may become a 
 
 39. The cap amount changes annually based on the Implicit Price Deflator for Personal 
Consumption Expenditures as published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United 
States Department of Commerce.  MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.4 (2000).  The cap amount for 2004 
was $565,000.  Wenske & Karash, supra note 16, at D1. 
 40. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 41. The impact of damage caps on overall health care costs is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  However, a recent report by the Congressional Budget Office showed that malpractice 
costs represented less than two percent of overall health care spending.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 6 (2004), available at  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf. 
 42. 832 S.W.2d 898, 904–05 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (holding the caps constitutional in 
response to an equal protection challenge). 
 43. Id. at 904–05.  The plaintiff argued that the statutory cap on non-economic damages was 
an unconstitutional violation of federal and state equal protection rights.  Id. at 903.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not violate state and federal guarantees of 
equal protection because the cap on non-economic damages in a malpractice action against a 
health care provider was rationally related to the goals of reducing medical malpractice 
premiums, preventing physicians and others from discontinuing high risk practices and 
procedures, and preserving public health.  Id. at 904. 
 44. Id. at 904. 
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profit if not used.”45  Because of the time lag from when a claim is filed to 
when it is paid, insurers measure losses in two ways.  First, insurers look at 
actual losses paid on claims in a given year, regardless of when the claim was 
filed.46  Actual losses are used to calculate insurers’ cash-flow ratio (the 
percent of premium actually paid out on claims during the year).47  Second, 
insurers estimate their incurred losses by projecting payouts on new claims to 
be paid in the future and revising payments and projections for claims filed in 
previous years.48  These estimated or incurred losses are used to calculate 
insurers’ loss ratio (the percent of premium estimated to be paid out on 
claims).49  As discussed later, insurers consider incurred losses when setting 
premium prices but are not required to explain or justify their estimates or to 
follow a uniform standard or method in calculating them.50 
Missouri’s cap represents the maximum amount a plaintiff may receive in 
non-economic damages.51  By limiting non-economic damages, the cap limits 
insurer costs by reducing actual payouts and uncertainty in estimating future 
payouts.52  While a cap is intended to reduce costs for insurers, it does not 
require that these savings get passed on to physicians in the form of lower 
premiums.  Instead, a cap relies on competition or state regulation to translate 
the savings into lower premiums.53 
C. Judicial Decisions Allowing Multiple Damage Caps 
As discussed earlier, Missouri enacted a cap on non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice lawsuits in 1986.54  The purpose of the cap was to lower 
the price of medical malpractice insurance by limiting non-economic damage 
payouts and reducing insurer uncertainty.55  But recent Missouri court rulings 
allow multiple caps in cases with multiple defendants, occurrences of 
 
 45. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 426 (5th 
ed. 2004) (summarizing report on the insurance industry from the U.S. General Accounting 
Office). 
 46. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. It is important to note that Missouri’s cap does not limit most damages in the average 
award because most damages are economic, for medical expenses and lost wages.  See discussion 
infra Part III.A.2. 
 52. STEIN, supra note 11, § 8:31.  Caps reduce “legal uncertainty and thereby . . . decrease 
the costs of liability insurance.”  Id. 
 53. But if competition is not present in the market, insurers may refuse to reduce premiums 
even with lower costs, opting instead to keep the profits.  See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 54. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 55. See discussion supra Part II.B; Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital, 832 S.W.2d 898, 
904–05 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
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negligence, and plaintiffs.56  This section analyzes the reasoning behind these 
decisions and clarifies when multiple caps are permitted. 
1. A Cap per Defendant: Vincent v. Johnson 
In the 1992 case of Vincent v. Johnson, the Missouri Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of multiple caps for the first time.57  In Vincent, the issue 
was whether two statutory damage caps applied in a medical malpractice 
lawsuit with two defendants, a hospital and a physician.58  The Vincent Court 
looked to the damage cap statute’s definition of “defendant.”59  Under section 
538.210.2(1), if the employees and physicians are insured by the hospital’s 
malpractice policy, then the hospital and its “employees and physicians” are 
counted as one defendant and only one cap applies.60  Otherwise, if the 
physician was not insured by the hospital, they count as two defendants, and 
the plaintiff may be awarded non-economic damages equal to two caps.61  The 
Vincent Court remanded the case to decide this issue.62 
2. A Cap per Occurrence of Negligence: Romero v. United States 
Missouri’s damage cap statute provides no plaintiff shall recover non-
economic damages in excess of the cap “per occurrence.”63  In Romero v. 
United States, the issue was what constituted an “occurrence” under Missouri’s 
damage cap statute and whether multiple caps were allowed for multiple 
occurrences.64  The Romero Court held that the statutory meaning of 
“occurrence” was “a singular wrongful act sued upon” and not the “receipt of 
injury” by the plaintiff.65  The Romero Court concluded two caps were 
permitted because the defendant committed two separate and distinct acts of 
medical malpractice, even though only one injury resulted.66 
 
 56. Missouri’s damage cap statute states that “no plaintiff” may recover more than the 
statutory cap amount “per occurrence . . . from any one defendant.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 
(2000).  Thus, the issue of multiple damage caps turns on the definition and relationship of the 
following three statutory terms: defendant, occurrence, and plaintiff. 
 57. 833 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 58. Id. 
 59. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.2(1) (2000). 
 60. Id.  A defendant under section 538.210.2(1) is “[a] hospital . . . and its employees and 
physician employees who are insured under the hospital’s professional liability insurance policy 
or the hospital’s self-insurance maintained for professional liability purposes . . . .”  Id. 
 61. Vincent, 833 S.W.2d at 864. 
 62. Id. at 867. 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000). 
 64. 865 F. Supp. 585, 593 (E.D. Mo. 1994).  Romero was filed in federal court because the 
plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the federal court was 
bound by Missouri’s damage cap statute.  Id. at 587. 
 65. Id. at 593. 
 66. Id. 
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The plaintiff in Romero alleged two acts of medical malpractice, a 
misdiagnosis and an improper surgery based on the misdiagnosis.67  The 
plaintiff claimed non-economic damages of $673,000, which exceeded the 
damage cap of $462,000.68  The plaintiff argued there were two occurrences of 
negligence because there were two acts of malpractice, a misdiagnosis and an 
improper surgery.  Thus, two caps were permitted, and full recovery was 
possible.69  The defense argued that “occurrence” meant the plaintiff’s receipt 
of injury.70  Because the plaintiff was only injured in the surgery, the defense 
contended that one cap applied.71 
The Romero court agreed with the plaintiff and held two caps applied 
because the misdiagnosis and improper surgery were two separate occurrences 
of negligence, each establishing a prima facie case of medical malpractice.72  
Because two caps were appropriate, the plaintiff was entitled to the full 
$673,000 sought in non-economic damages.73 
3. A Cap per Plaintiff: Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc. and Wright v. 
Barr 
In the 2001 case of Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., the Missouri Court 
of Appeals Southern District held a single damage cap applied in a wrongful 
death action brought by a single plaintiff, the victim’s mother, even though the 
mother claimed to have brought the action on behalf of the victim’s nonparty 
father as well as on her own behalf.74 
The decedent in Burns was an eighteen-year-old male who suffered a fatal 
asthma attack while being transported by ambulance to the hospital.75  The 
plaintiff, the decedent’s mother, sued the ambulance company, the emergency 
medical service (EMS) provider, and the hospital for medical negligence.76  
The jury found the EMS provider to be 100% at fault and awarded the plaintiff 
$1,500,000 in non-economic damages.77  Pursuant to section 538.210, the trial 
court reduced the award to $528,000, equal to one damage cap in 2000, the 
year of the trial.78 
 
 67. Id. at 588–90. 
 68. Id. at 593.  Under section 538.210, the cap is adjusted each year for inflation, and the 
amount that applies in a case depends on the year the case is brought.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
538.210.4 (2000). 
 69. Romero, 865 F. Supp. at 591. 
 70. Id. at 593. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 591–92. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 75. Id. at 471–72. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 472. 
 78. Id. at 484. 
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In Burns, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
multiple damage caps for three reasons.79  First, the plain language of the 
statute states “no plaintiff” shall recover more than a statutory cap amount.80  
The decedent’s father was not a plaintiff or even a party to the action.81  
Moreover, the father had “the right to intervene at any time before any 
judgment” was entered in the case, but the record showed no such effort on his 
part.82 
Second, under Missouri’s wrongful death statute, a surviving spouse, 
children, parents or others named in the statute may sue for damages for the 
wrongful death of a decedent.83  But, “[o]nly one action may be brought . . . 
against any one defendant for the death of any one person.”84  The court 
reasoned that since the legislature knew the wrongful death statute created only 
“one indivisible cause of action” and did not make special provisions in the 
damage cap for a wrongful death action, multiple damage caps were not 
permitted.85 
Third, the legislative intent of the damage cap statute was “to impose 
specific limitations on the traditional tort causes of action available against a 
health care provider . . . to temper the high cost of health care.”86  Allowing 
multiple caps in a wrongful death suit would permit a widow to “sue for her 
husband’s wrongful death and recover a separate cap for herself and each of 
the couple’s six children.”87  Because this did not “further the legislative goal 
of harnessing increasing health care costs,” the Burns Court rejected multiple 
caps in a wrongful death suit.88 
Just weeks after the Burns court denied multiple caps for plaintiffs in a 
wrongful death suit, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District permitted 
two caps for two plaintiffs in a suit for medical malpractice and loss of 
consortium.89  In Wright v. Barr, Mrs. Wright sued a physician for negligently 
causing her to suffer a stroke, and her husband sued for loss of consortium.90  
Unlike a wrongful death claim, Mr. Wright’s loss of consortium claim was 
found separate from and independent of his wife’s claim of medical 
 
 79. Burns, 55 S.W.3d at 485–87. 
 80. Id. at 485 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.095.2, Missouri’s permissive joinder statute). 
 83. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080.1 (2000). 
 84. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080.2; Burns, 55 S.W.3d. at 486 (citing Nelms v. Bright, 299 
S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. 1957) (en banc)). 
 85. Burns, 55 S.W.3d at 486–87; see also Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000) (presuming the legislature to be aware of state law at the time it enacts a statute). 
 86. Burns, 55 S.W.3d at 486; see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
 87. Burns, 55 S.W.3d.at 486–87. 
 88. Id. at 487. 
 89. Wright v. Barr, 62 S.W.3d 509, 537–38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 90. Id. at 515. 
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negligence.91  Because Mr. Wright’s loss of consortium claim was separate, he 
was a second plaintiff and entitled to a second statutory cap.92  The Wright 
Court found this outcome supported by the policy of the loss of consortium 
action because a person claiming loss of consortium suffers different damages 
than the injured spouse.93  Thus, under Wright, two caps are permitted when 
there are two plaintiffs, one injured from negligence and the other claiming 
damages from loss of consortium.94 
4. Multiple Caps Upheld: Scott v. SSM Healthcare and Cook v. Newman 
In Scott v. SSM Healthcare, the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District 
revisited the issue of whether multiple caps were allowed for multiple 
occurrences of negligence.95  The Scott court followed the ruling in Romero, 
permitting a cap for every act of negligence, even if only one injury resulted.96 
In Scott, the plaintiff sued a hospital for medical malpractice of two of its 
physicians under vicarious liability.97  The plaintiff alleged two negligent acts: 
misdiagnosis and failure to direct the plaintiff to the emergency room.98  These 
two acts caused a single injury, a sinus infection that spread to the plaintiff’s 
brain.99 
Persuaded by Romero, the Scott Court interpreted “occurrence” as a 
singular wrongful act sued upon, not the receipt of injury by the plaintiff.100  
The Scott court determined that if the legislature intended one damage cap to 
apply regardless of the number of negligent acts, “the clearest and most 
unambiguous way . . . to have expressed such an intent would have been to 
simply leave the words ‘per occurrence’ out of the statute entirely.”101  
 
 91. Id. at 537–38. 
 92. Id. (explaining that while loss of consortium claim is “derivative” of the underlying 
claim of negligence, it is still a separate action that permits another cap). 
 93. Id. at 537; see also Stahlheber v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48, 64 (Mo. 1970). 
 94. Wright, 62 S.W.3d at 537–38. 
 95. 70 S.W.3d 560, 570–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 96. Id. at 571.  The Scott court also followed the ruling in Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 
859, 864 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), which held that the hospital and the physicians insured by the 
hospital’s malpractice policy counted as only one defendant.  Scott, 70 S.W.3d at 569 n.9; see 
discussion supra Part II.C.1.  In Scott, Judge Teitelman pointed out that while this issue was 
addressed in Vincent, the “Vincent [case] did not decide” the issue in Scott of “whether a 
defendant hospital could be liable to a plaintiff for two non-economic damage caps based on two 
separate acts of negligence by its agents.”  Scott, 70 S.W.3d at 569 n.9. 
 97. Id. at 562. 
 98. Id. at 563. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 571 (citing Romero v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 585, 593 (E.D. Mo. 1994)).  
Because the ruling in Romero was by the U.S. District Court, it was not binding on the Missouri 
Court of Appeals in Scott.  Id.  As a result, the issue of the interpretation of “occurrence” as used 
in the damage cap statute was of first impression for Missouri courts.  Id. 
 101. Scott, 70 S.W.3d at 571 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000)). 
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Otherwise, the words “per occurrence” would be “mere surplusage which 
added nothing at all to the intended statutory meaning.”102  Thus, because two 
separate occurrences of malpractice contributed to plaintiff’s injury, two 
statutory damage caps applied.103 
In July 2004, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District decided the 
most recent case involving multiple damage caps, Cook v. Newman.104  In 
Cook, a decedent’s husband and two children sued two physicians and a health 
care corporation for the wrongful death of their spouse and mother.105  The 
Cook Court had two significant holdings.  First, Cook affirmed the trial court 
and permitted multiple caps for multiple defendants and occurrences of 
negligence.106  Because two defendants each committed two acts of 
negligence, four caps applied in Cook.107  Second, Cook reversed the trial court 
and denied multiple caps for multiple plaintiffs in a wrongful death action.108  
Even though three plaintiffs brought the wrongful death suit in Cook, only one 
cap applied.109  Thus, the number of damage caps in Cook was reduced from 
twelve to four, and the non-economic damages were reduced from $6.56 to 
$2.19 million.110 
In reaching its conclusion, the Cook Court distinguished and relied on 
several cases discussed above.  In finding two caps applied for two defendants, 
the Cook court looked to the definition of defendants in Missouri’s damage cap 
statute, section 538.210.2.111  The Cook Court decided that section 
538.210.2(3) applied because the defendants were a health care corporation 
and the corporation’s physician.112  Under section 538.210.2(3), a health care 
provider and its employees count as one defendant, but physicians are not 
mentioned.113  The Cook Court found this omission significant: “the legislature 
 
 102. Id.; see Rich v. Peters, 50 S.W.3d 814, 819–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the 
legislature is presumed not to insert superfluous language in a statute). 
 103. Scott, 70 S.W.3d at 571. 
 104. 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 884–85. 
 106. Id. at 890–92. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 887–88. 
 109. Cook, 142 S.W.3d at 887–88.  The decedent’s husband and two children were treated as 
one plaintiff with one cap.  Id. at 888. 
 110. Id. at 886, 895. 
 111. Id. at 891; MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.2 (2000). 
 112. Id. at 891–92.  This is distinguishable from Vincent and Scott where the defendants were 
a hospital and its physicians and the first paragraph of section 538.210.2 applied.  See supra note 
96 and accompanying text. 
 113. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.2(3).  This language is different than that of section 
538.210.2(1), which was applied in Vincent and Scott.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
In section 538.210.2(1), a hospital and “employees and physicians” who are insured by the 
hospital’s policy are one defendant. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.2(1).  But under section 
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did not intend the term ‘employees’ . . . to include physicians.”114  As a result, 
two separate damage caps were allowed for the health care corporation and the 
physician.115 
In Cook, the Court agreed with the reasoning of Scott and Romero and 
allowed multiple damage caps for multiple acts of negligence, even though one 
injury resulted.116  Moreover, the Cook Court followed Burns and held only 
one cap applied in a wrongful death action with multiple plaintiffs.117 
After the Missouri Supreme Court declined to rehear Scott and Cook, 
multiple caps were clearly permitted under Missouri’s damage cap statute.118  
As discussed earlier, supporters of Missouri’s cap argue that these decisions 
weakened the cap’s effectiveness in controlling medical malpractice 
premiums.119  The next section analyzes Missouri medical malpractice data to 
assess proposals to tighten Missouri’s cap by eliminating multiple caps and 
lowering the cap amount.  But these proposals to tighten Missouri’s cap are 
found inadequate and stronger regulations are needed. 
III.  ANALYSIS: THE LIMITS OF MISSOURI’S CAP AND THE NEED FOR 
REGULATION 
As discussed earlier, reform of Missouri’s damage cap is practically certain 
because supporters of the cap believe it is too weak to effectively control 
premiums.120  This section analyzes Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance 
data and considers whether proposals to tighten Missouri’s damage cap will 
ensure low, stable malpractice premiums.  After these proposals, this Comment 
concludes that a cap alone will not solve the problem of high, unstable 
malpractice premiums—stronger regulation of medical malpractice insurance 
is needed. 
A. Missouri’s Medical Malpractice Insurance Data 
Missouri law requires medical malpractice insurers of health-care 
providers and facilities to report malpractice claims data to the Missouri 
 
538.210.2(3), a health care provider and only its employees are one defendant—physicians are 
not mentioned.  MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.2(3). 
 114. Cook, 142 S.W.3d at 892. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 889–91. 
 117. Id. at 887–88.  The Cook court limited its holding to wrongful death actions, 
distinguishing the ruling in Wright where multiple caps were allowed for multiple plaintiffs in a 
loss of consortium action.  Id.; see also supra Part II.C.3. 
 118. Scott v. SSM Healthcare, 70 S.W.3d 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied; Cook v. 
Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied. 
 119. See discussion supra Part I. and notes 13–14. 
 120. See discussion supra Part I. 
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Department of Insurance (MDI).121  MDI also obtains certified annual financial 
data as reported by insurers operating in Missouri.122  MDI analyzes and 
publishes the data in an annual report.123  These MDI reports show trends in 
the medical malpractice insurance market over the past seventeen years.124  In 
November 2004, MDI released the data for 2003.125 
MDI’s data confirms the problem—despite Missouri’s cap, premiums and 
loss estimates hit record highs in 2002 and 2003.126  But the data also reveals 
an inconsistency.  Premiums and loss estimates increased despite substantial, 
often record, decreases in medical malpractice claims, payouts, and actual 
losses.127  This inconsistency raises the question considered in the next section: 
what reform will solve the problem of high medical malpractice premiums?128 
1. Medical Malpractice Claims Fell to Record Lows 
In 2003, Missouri medical malpractice claims both filed and paid fell to 
record lows.129  New claims filed against health care providers fell to 1369, a 
16% drop from 1638 in 2002, and the lowest number of new claims since MDI 
began collecting data in 1986.130 
New claims filed against physicians also dropped to a record low of 664, 
down nearly 14% from 770 in 2002.131  In 2003, claims that received payment 
 
 121. MO. REV. STAT. § 383.105 (2000).  MDI collects and maintains the most extensive state 
database in the country on medical malpractice insurance using data from medical malpractice 
insurers.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 122. MDI Press Release, Apr. 27, 2004, supra note 19. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  In 2003, legislators and physicians attacked MDI’s report because many larger 
hospitals in the state are self-insured and have refused to report their data.  Id.  While self-insurers 
are still required by state law to report their claims data, MDI has no enforcement powers.  Id.  
MDI sought the ability to fine entities that violated the reporting law in both the 2003 and 2004 
legislative sessions, but Missouri’s General Assembly did not approve the changes.  Id.  As a 
result, it has been argued that missing data from these self-insureds have skewed data results.  Id.  
But MDI maintains that the failure of a few self-insured institutions has little effect on overall 
trends reported because these institutions have not reported for years.  Id.  Moreover, MDI 
omitted all self-insureds from its data; no changes resulted—there were still record lows in claim 
and decreases in average payments.  Id.  The trends reported by MDI follow those of the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a federally mandated database of malpractice claims against 
physicians, which is the only other source of data.  Press Release, Missouri Department of 
Insurance, 2003 Final Count: Claims Continue Downward Trend; Actual Malpractice Payouts 
Drop Substantially (Nov. 4, 2004), available at www.insurance.state.mo.us [hereinafter MDI 
Press Release, Nov. 4, 2004]. 
 125. MDI Press Release, Nov. 4, 2004, supra note 124. 
 126. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 127. See infra Parts III.A.1–4. 
 128. See discussion infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
 129. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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fell to a record low of 448, a 21% drop from 569 in 2002.132  Claims paid on 
physician policies in 2003 fell to 170—nearly 26% lower than 229 in 2002, 
and the second lowest number of paid claims on record.133  Claims filed and 
paid by all medical malpractice insurers from 1990 to 2003 are displayed in 
Figure 1.134  Claims filed and paid by physician medical malpractice insurers 
are shown in Figure 2.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Data taken from MDI’s 2003 report.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 135. Id. 
Figure 1. Claims Filed and Paid: All Medical Malpractice Insurers 1990-2003
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2. Damages Paid for Medical Malpractice Decreased Substantially 
Damages paid to victims of medical malpractice also dropped substantially 
in 2003.136  Overall damages paid by insurers to malpractice victims decreased 
from $118.7 million to $93.5 million, or by 21%.137  Even greater reductions 
occurred in payouts for physician malpractice, which dropped from $79.4 
million to $52.9 million, or by 33%.138 
The average damage award remained essentially flat in 2003, falling less 
than 1% to $207,068.139  Because a handful of larger awards skew the figures, 
the average awards were considerably higher than the typical or median 
payment, which was $111,250 in 2003.140  The majority of these awards were 
for economic damages, such as lost wages and medical bills, and are not 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21.  Average awards have remained stable since 2000, 
when they jumped dramatically.  Id.  MDI studies have shown that the long-term increase in 
awards has not keep pace with increases in general inflation on lost wages, medical inflation of 
health care costs, and the severity of injuries.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. 
 140. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
Figure 2. Claims Filed and Paid:  Medical Malpractice Insurers of Physicians 1990-2003
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limited by Missouri law.141  On the contrary, non-economic damages, which 
are limited by Missouri’s cap, were only a small portion of this total amount 
and far below the cap limit.  In 2003, the average non-economic damage award 
was only $85,140—40% of the total average award.142  The median or typical 
non-economic award was even lower, $27,872—just 25% of the total median 
award.143  Both of these figures were far below Missouri’s cap amount of 
$557,000 in 2003.144  The average and median total and non-economic 
damages paid for medical malpractice claims are shown in Table 1.145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to the President’s rhetoric of “big jury verdicts” and an “out of 
control” liability system, few claims reach the cap limit in Missouri, and the 
number is declining.146  Only five payouts reached Missouri’s cap on non-
economic damages of $557,000 in 2003, down from thirteen in 2002, and the 
 
 141. Press Release, Missouri Department of Insurance, 2003 Malpractice Claims Reach 
Record Lows—Cash Flow Yields Windfall for Insurers (April 16, 2004), available at 
www.insurance.state.mo.us [hereinafter MDI Press Release, Apr. 16, 2004]. 
 142. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 143. Id. 
 144. MDI Press Release, Apr. 16, 2004, supra note 141. 
 145. Data taken from MDI’s 2003 report.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 146. President Bush Address, supra note 1. 
Table 1.  Average and Median Payment Per Claim, All Medical Malpractice 
Claims in Missouri, 1990-2003 
  Total Damages Paid Non-Economic Damage Paid 
Close Year Median Mean Median Mean Cap For Year 
1990 $22,760  $99,621  $5,000  $45,235  $401,000  
1991 $37,500  $124,233  $8,333  $57,430  $430,000  
1992 $35,000  $146,470  $12,500  $81,276  $446,000  
1993 $40,000  $143,811  $15,000  $69,754  $462,000  
1994 $50,000  $130,766  $18,300  $69,450  $474,000  
1995 $50,000  $126,228  $20,000  $69,724  $482,000  
1996 $50,000  $170,534  $20,000  $86,928  $492,000  
1997 $40,000  $163,404  $15,000  $79,679  $513,000  
1998 $45,000  $161,938  $12,500  $79,166  $513,000  
1999 $50,000  $131,265  $9,250  $59,380  $517,000  
2000 $99,950  $202,948  $27,630  $95,296  $528,000  
2001 $81,667  $167,863  $21,092  $78,280  $540,000  
2002 $100,000  $207,734  $35,000  $97,910  $547,000  
2003 $111,250  $207,068  $27,872  $85,140  $557,000  
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lowest number on record.147  Only eleven awards exceeded $1 million in 2003, 
down from fifteen in 2002.148  Again, most of the damages in these large 
awards were economic and not limited by Missouri’s non-economic damage 
cap.149 
3. Medical Malpractice Premiums and Loss Estimates at Record Highs 
Despite these substantial decreases in claims and payouts, medical 
malpractice premiums climbed to record highs.150  From 2000 to 2003, overall 
malpractice insurance premiums doubled, rising from $113.5 to $227 
million.151  But this increase in premiums far exceeded the increase in payouts 
in the same period.  From 2000 to 2003, payouts increased by 32%, from $70.6 
million to $93.5 million.152  Similarly, from 2000 to 2003, premiums paid by 
physicians increased 121%, from $61.4 million to $136.4 million, while actual 
payments rose only 14%.153 
The increase in premiums coincided with dramatic increases in estimated 
losses, amounts reserved for future payouts on claims.154  In 2001, insurers 
estimated future losses of $65.1 million for claims filed that year.155  In 2002, 
estimated losses skyrocketed more than 250% to a record high of $167.9 
million and remained high at $164.3 million in 2003.156  Also in 2002, 
insurers’ loss ratio, the percentage of earned premiums estimated to be paid out 
on new claims, increased from 81% to 108%.157  In 2003, the loss ratio 
improved slightly but remained high at 97%.158  In 2002, insurers of physicians 
and surgeons also experienced a dramatic increase in the loss ratio—nearly 
doubling from 61% to 117%.159  But in 2003, loss ratio improved for 
 
 147. MDI Press Release, Apr. 27, 2004, supra note 19. 
 148. Id. Only two awards exceeded $2 million in 2003; the same as in 2002.  Id.  No awards 
exceeded $3 million.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 149. MDI Press Release, Apr. 16, 2004, supra note 141. 
 150. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  MDI studies have shown that the long-term increase in awards has not keep pace 
with increases in general inflation on lost wages, medical inflation of health care costs, and the 
severity of injuries.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. 
 153. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  The loss ratio is equal to losses incurred divided by premium earned.  See supra note 
32 and accompanying text. 
 158. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 159. Id. 
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physicians and surgeons, falling to 90%.160  The loss ratios for physician 
medical malpractice insurers from 1990 to 2003 are displayed in Figure 3.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But while insurers’ loss estimates increased, actual losses fell dramatically.  
Insurers’ cash-flow ratio, the percentage of premiums actually paid out on 
claims, declined to 45%, the lowest since 1994. 162  This means that medical 
malpractice insurers actually paid out only 45 cents of every dollar in premium 
collected—a significant drop from 63 cents in 2002 and a ten-year average of 
62 cents.163  The cash-flow ratio for physician malpractice fell to a record low 
39%; insurers paid out only 39 cents of every dollar in premium collected from 
physicians.164  Thus, MDI concluded, “the growth of premiums is far 
outstripping actual losses,”165 and this is creating a “cash-flow windfall” for 
insurers.166  The cash-flow ratios for insurers of physician malpractice are 
displayed in Figure 4. 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Data taken from MDI’s 2003 report.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 162. Id.  Cash flow ratio is equal to direct losses paid divided by direct premium written in a 
given year.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 163. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 164. Id. 
 165. MDI Press Release, Nov. 4, 2004, supra note 124. 
 166. MDI Press Release, Apr. 16, 2004, supra note 141. 
 
Figure 3.  Medical Malpractice Market: Estimated Losses on Physician Policies, 1990-2003 
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4. Conclusion 
Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance data reveals an inconsistency: 
premiums and loss estimates climbed to record highs while claims, payouts, 
and actual losses fell to record lows.167  This casts doubt on the President’s 
theory that “junk lawsuits” and an “out of control” liability system are driving 
up the price of premiums,168 and raises two critical questions.  First, are the 
past increases in premiums justified?  Second, what kind of reform will best 
ensure low, stable premiums in the future?  Unfortunately, further data to 
answer the first question is unavailable.169  Missouri’s insurance regulations do 
 
 167. See supra Parts III.A.1–III.A.3. 
 168. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 169. A nationwide study from the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) explained 
that premium increases may be more a product of a cyclical insurance industry and overall 
economy because the insurance industry derives most of its income from the investment of 
premiums.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES (2003), 
at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf [hereinafter GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS].  The GAO 
report found that “[m]ultiple factors, including falling investment income and rising reinsurance 
costs, have contributed to recent increases in premium rates.”  Id.  MDI has noted that Missouri’s 
premiums have spiked three times in the past thirty years, all coinciding with recessions in the 
national economy.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.  The GAO explained the industry 
cycle as follows: 
[I]nsurer losses anticipated in the late 1980s did not materialize as projected, so insurers 
went into the 1990s with reserves and premium rates . . .  higher than the actual losses 
they would experience . . . [and] began a decade of high investment returns. This 
Figure 4. Medical Malpractice Market: Actual Losses from Physician Policies, 1990-2003 
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not require insurers to explain or justify increases in premiums or loss 
estimates.170  Nevertheless, the high price of premiums confirms the need for 
some reform.  The next section considers the second question: What reform 
will achieve low, stable medical malpractice premiums in Missouri? 
B. Reforming Tort Reform: Tightening the Damage Cap 
The previous section analyzed data describing Missouri’s malpractice 
insurance market and found an inconsistency—despite low claims, payouts, 
and actual losses, premiums and loss estimates remained high in 2003.171  The 
data supports the need for further reform to achieve low, stable medical 
malpractice premiums.  The only question that remains is what kind of reform.  
This section evaluates proposals to tighten Missouri’s cap by eliminating 
multiple caps and lowering the cap amount. 172  Supporters of these proposals 
argue that tightening the cap will more effectively control malpractice 
 
emerging profitability encouraged insurers to expand their market share, as both the 
downward adjustment of loss reserves and high investment returns increased insurers’ 
income. As a result, insurers were generally able to keep premium rates flat or even 
reduce them, although the medical malpractice market as a whole continued to experience 
modestly increasing underlying losses throughout the decade. Finally, by the mid- to late 
1990s, as excess reserves were exhausted and investment income fell below expectations, 
insurers’ profitability declined. Regulators found that some insurers were insolvent, with 
insufficient reserves and capital to pay future claims. . . . As a result of all of these factors, 
insurers . . . requested and received large rate increases in many states. It remains to be 
seen whether these increases will, as occurred in the 1980s, be found to have exceeded 
those necessary to pay for future claims losses, thus contributing to the beginning of the 
next insurance cycle. 
GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra, at 44–45. 
  Moreover, GAO investigators found that the reports of physicians moving to other states, 
retiring, or closing practices in response to the purported “crisis” complained of by the AMA 
were, in fact, not accurate.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 5 (2003), at 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf.  As to the issue of availability to medical care, the GAO 
found that there were localized but not widespread access problems, and these particular instances 
were often in rural locations where keeping physicians has always been a problem.  Id.  In the 
end, the GAO recommended no “executive action” be taken but suggested that to “further the 
understanding of conditions in current and future medical malpractice markets, Congress may 
wish to consider encouraging the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and state 
insurance regulators to identify and collect additional, mutually beneficial data necessary for 
evaluating the medical malpractice insurance market.”  GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 
169. 
 170. The need for Missouri to adopt stronger regulations that both require insurers to report 
data used in calculating loss estimates and premiums and permit MDI to reject excessive or 
inadequate premiums on the basis of this data is discussed infra Part III.C. 
 171. See supra Part III.A. 
 172. There are state and federal proposals to tighten the damage cap.  See supra notes 12-14 
and accompanying text. 
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premiums.173  But these reforms alone will not solve the problems of high 
medical malpractice premiums.  These proposals will limit recoveries in only a 
few cases and provide minimal savings for insurers.174  Moreover, they do not 
require insurers to translate their savings into lower premiums.175  Thus, 
stronger insurance regulation is necessary, which is considered in the following 
section.176 
1. Eliminating Multiple Caps 
The potential problem of multiple caps is obvious—plaintiffs can be 
awarded several times more non-economic damages than allowed before 
multiple caps.177  Multiple parties and negligent acts are common in medical 
malpractice litigation.178  Higher payouts from multiple caps can increase 
insurers’ losses, and these losses must be recovered by raising the price of 
malpractice premiums.179 
But according to MDI’s 2003 report, multiple caps “continued to have a 
minimal impact on payouts.”180  This is because multiple caps are not 
necessary in most cases, even if permitted by law.  As discussed above, non-
economic damages rarely exceed a single cap, and in most cases, they are far 
less.181  According to MDI, multiple caps affected only nine cases in 2003.182  
Because few cases are affected by multiple caps, eliminating multiple caps 
would provide only minimal savings for insurers.  Eliminating multiple caps 
would have saved $3.1 million in 2003.183  This amount was only 1.7% of 
premiums and 3.3% of overall losses in 2003.184  In 2002, multiple caps 
increased payments in only twelve cases.185  Eliminating multiple caps would 
have saved $2.6 million, only 1.5% of premiums and 2.2% of losses that 
 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 12–14. 
 174. See infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2. 
 175. See infra Part III.B.3 
 176. See infra Part III.C. 
 177. See supra Part II.C. 
 178. In the past 14 years, fifty-six percent of medical malpractice claims that closed with 
payment in Missouri had multiple defendants.  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 
 179. Insurance company lobbyists initially estimated multiple caps would double or triple 
overall losses.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 180. Id.  As shown above, payouts and actual losses declined in 2003.  See supra Part III.A.2 
and III.A.3 
 181. See infra Part III.B.2.  The typical non-economic damage award was only five percent of 
total damages awarded in 2003.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 182. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21.  Based on insurer evaluations, these cases that involve 
multiple caps are serious—most involved death, quadriplegia or severe brain damage with the 
need for lifetime care or a terminal diagnosis.  Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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year.186  These savings are relatively minor considering that malpractice 
premiums doubled from 2000 to 2003, from $113.5 to $227 million.187 
While multiple caps have had a minimal impact on actual losses, they have 
likely increased estimated losses and higher premiums.188  As discussed earlier, 
insurers set premiums to cover actual losses from damages paid and estimated 
losses on claims to be paid in the future.189  After the Scott decision in 2002, 
estimated losses increased by more than 250%.190  In 2002, the loss ratio for 
medical malpractice insurance was 108% overall, an increase from 81% in 
2001.191  The loss ratio for physician malpractice insurance was even higher, 
118% in 2002, nearly double the 61% figure in 2001.192  While loss estimates 
and ratios fell slightly in 2003, they remained near record highs.193 
According to MDI, the Scott decision contributed to the drastic increase in 
loss estimates.  Before Scott, malpractice insurers priced their coverage 
assuming Missouri’s damage cap statute provided a single, per-injury cap.194  
But after Scott confirmed that multiple caps were permitted, malpractice 
insurers could not retroactively re-price their product and had to increase their 
loss estimates and premiums.195  MDI’s 2003 Report stated: 
Predictability allows insurers to have greater confidence in their risk 
projections.  Missouri’s 1986 reforms have been tested by time and provide a 
substantial pool of loss data on their effect.  Uncertainty because of Scott likely 
will encourage insurers to raise rates and keep them high for several years until 
the effect becomes clear.196 
According to MDI, multiple caps have not helped attract new insurers to 
Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance market.197  Potential insurers 
thinking of entering Missouri’s medical malpractice market likely see multiple 
caps as an “added risk.”198  As discussed later, the lack of competition in 
Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance market has kept premium prices 
high.199  Thus, in 2003, MDI supported legislation to overrule Scott and limit 
multiple caps.200 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See supra Part II.B. 
 190. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 196. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.; see infra Part III.C.3. 
 199. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 
 200. Id. 
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The data from MDI shows that eliminating multiple caps may reduce 
insurer uncertainty, loss estimates, and ultimately, premiums.  But because few 
cases are actually affected by multiple caps and eliminating them will provide 
only minor savings for insurers, further reform is necessary.  The next section 
considers the proposal of a lower cap amount. 
2. Lowering the Cap Amount 
Another proposal to tighten Missouri’s damage cap is to lower the cap 
amount.201It is argued that a lower cap would provide more savings, reducing 
claims, payouts, and the overall cost of medical malpractice insurance.202  
Insurers’ savings could then translate into lower premiums.203 
MDI analyzed the effect of a lower cap in its 2003 Report.204  It found that 
“legislative proposals to further reduce Missouri’s cap on non-economic 
damages would have produced few savings—or premium reductions—in 
2003.”205  The report evaluated the 2003 bill approved by Missouri’s House 
that lowered the cap from $565,000 to $350,000, without an adjustment for 
inflation.206  In 2003, the lower cap would have reduced payments in only 23 
cases, 5% of all paid claims that year.207  The lower cap would have reduced 
payments by $4.4 million, which was only 2.2% of premiums collected that 
year.208  A lower cap also would adversely affect those cases with the most 
severe injuries.  Of the cases reaching Missouri’s cap in 2003, most involved 
permanent injuries, such as quadriplegia or severe brain damage, with terminal 
diagnosis or the need for lifetime care.209 
Recent proposals have called for an even lower cap of $250,000.  A cap of 
$250,000 is part of President Bush’s medical malpractice reform bill pending 
in Congress.210  But even a cap of $250,000 provides insufficient savings.  The 
reduction would affect only 37 cases, or 7% of claims receiving payment,211 
and reduce overall damages by $8.1 million, or 4.7% of premiums collected.212  
Considering that premiums have doubled from 2000 to 2003, from $113.5 to 
 
 201. Id. at 35. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. MDI Press Release, Apr. 16, 2004, supra note 141. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. According to MDI, “the severity of claims receiving judgments equal to the Missouri 
caps averages a 7 or 8—permanent injury like quadriplegia, blindness, severe brain damage 
requiring lifetime care or terminal diagnosis.”  MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.  This 
ranking of “7 or 8” is on a 1 to 9 scale, with 9 being death.  Id. at 17. 
 210. See President Bush Address, supra note 1. 
 211. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 35. 
 212. Id. 
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$227 million, savings from these proposals are inadequate.213  As MDI 
concluded, a lower cap provides limited savings “at a considerable cost for the 
small number of cases in which patients suffer the greatest.”214 
3. The Real “Limit” of a Cap 
As discussed above, Missouri’s cap is a limited solution to the problem of 
high medical malpractice premiums.  The cap restricts only non-economic 
damages, while the largest portion of medical malpractice awards are 
economic damages, which are unlimited.215  The cap reduces payouts in only a 
few cases, typically involving the most severely injured patients.216  Thus, 
tightening Missouri’s cap will provide minimal savings and only by restricting 
the rights of those with claims far from frivolous.217 
But perhaps the greatest limitation is that a cap does not require insurers to 
lower premiums, even if savings result.  Instead, market competition or state 
regulation is necessary to induce lower premiums.  But in Missouri, both 
competition and regulation are lacking, and as a result, insurers can maintain 
high premiums, despite the cap, and keep the savings as profit.218 
After massive contractions in Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance 
market, the level of competition has reached a new low.  In 2002, Missouri’s 
market for physicians seeking malpractice coverage shrunk by 57%, due to 
 
 213. MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 214. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 35. 
 215. See infra Part III.B.2.  The typical or median non-economic damage award was only five 
percent of total damages awarded in 2003.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21. 
 216. See infra Part III.B.2.  The average non-economic damage award was $85,140, and the 
typical or median non-economic damage award was $27,872 in 2003, which was five percent of 
the cap amount.  MDI 2003 REPORT, supra note 21.  Missouri’s non-economic damage cap was 
$557,000 in 2003.  Id. 
 217. Medical malpractice insurers have agreed with these criticisms of caps.  See Wenske & 
Karash, supra note 16, at D1.  A major insurer of physicians in Missouri, the Medical Protective 
Company, has stated that “[n]on-economic damages are a small percentage of total losses paid.  
Capping non-economic damages will show loss savings of 1 percent.”  Id.  Moreover, it has been 
argued that non-economic damage caps discriminate against patients with limited economic 
damages, such as retired persons, children, and housewives.  Rachel Zimmerman & Joseph T. 
Hallinan, Life Values: As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1.  These victims of malpractice have minimal lost wages, a major 
component of unlimited economic damages.  Id.  Caps on non-economic damages make these 
claims less valuable, and studies have show that they may have difficulty finding representation.  
Id.  Others have argued that caps on non-economic damages lead to greater reliance on public 
assistance because low-income patients have no other resource to pay for unforeseen medical 
expenses and basic needs.  Insurance Regulation  vs. Tort Reform: Hearings Before the House 
Energy and Commerce Comm., Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Cong. 18 
(2003) (statement of Harvey Rosenfield, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights). 
 218. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 7, 44. 
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insurer withdrawals and insolvencies.219  As a result, five companies control 
83% of the Missouri market for physician malpractice insurance.220  Only three 
companies offer new malpractice policies for physicians.221  Thus, physicians 
without coverage or who are shopping for lower premiums have extremely 
limited options.222  According to MDI, this lack of competition has forced 
physicians to absorb premium increases, regardless of the amount.223 
In July 2003, the Missouri’s Director of Insurance, Scott B. Lakin, held a 
public hearing and determined that medical malpractice insurance was “not 
reasonably available” in the state.224  According to Lakin, “Our major problem 
is convincing companies to enter and compete in the Missouri market after so 
many insurers folded or withdrew nationally.  Policyholders desperately need 
price competition again, but insurers across the U.S. have been unwilling to 
devote more capital to this line of business so far.”225 
In addition to the lack of competition, MDI has “extremely limited 
authority” to regulate premiums charged by medical malpractice insurers.226  
Under the current regulatory scheme, MDI cannot reject premiums that are 
excessive or require insurers to explain or justify premium increases.227  
According to Jay Angoff, the state’s insurance director from 1993 to 1998, 
“Insurers in Missouri can charge whatever they want, and the director is 
absolutely impotent to do anything about it. . . .  That is an amazing aspect of 
the law.”228  Without competition or regulation, insurers can keep premiums 
high and any profits that result.  Thus, the proposals to tighten Missouri’s cap 
will not solve the problem of high premiums alone.  Instead, MDI needs more 
power to regulate medical malpractice insurance and ensure that savings from 
 
 219. Id. at 7.  Four companies withdrew or became insolvent in 2002, and a company 
representing twenty-six percent of Missouri’s market stopped writing new physician policies.  Id. 
at 26, 30. 
 220. See supra note 27. 
 221. See MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
 222. Id. at 27. 
 223. See id. 
 224. In response Missouri established a joint underwriting association (JUA) in 2003.  JUA 
provide medical malpractice coverage for several higher-risk specialties, including obstetricians, 
neurosurgeons, orthopedic surgeons, and emergency room physicians.  See Press Release, 
Missouri Department of Insurance, State Insurance Plan Begins Taking Medical Malpractice 
Applications (June 16, 2004), available at  http://www.insurance.state.mo.us/cgi-bin/news/ 
news2.cgi?newsid=EplZuEulAuUVgGZTId. 
 225. MO. DEP’T OF INS., 3 PUBLIC POLICIES 1,3 (2004), available at 
http://www.insurance.state.mo.us/news/pubpol/0405.pdf. 
 226. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Wenske & Karash, supra note 16, at D1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
922 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:895 
a cap are passed onto physicians in lower premiums.229  This reform is 
discussed next. 
C. Beyond the Cap: Insurance “Reform” 
As discussed above, proposals to tighten Missouri’s damage cap provide 
little actual savings and adversely affect the worst injured patients.230  
Moreover, a cap does not guarantee that the savings are translated into lower 
premiums.231  Because Missouri’s medical malpractice insurance market lacks 
competition, MDI needs more regulatory power to ensure premiums remain 
low and stable. 
This section analyzes Missouri’s insurance regulations and proposes giving 
MDI the authority to: (1) reject excessive or inadequate premiums, and (2) 
require insurers to justify premium changes.232  After proposing changes to 
Missouri’s regulations, the regulations are compared to those in California.233  
Like Missouri, physicians in California experienced high medical malpractice 
premiums despite a cap on non-economic damages.234  However, after stronger 
regulatory laws were enacted in California, the price of premiums fell and 
remained stable.235 
1. Missouri’s Regulation of Medical Malpractice Insurance 
MDI currently has the authority to regulate casualty or liability premiums 
under sections 379.420 to 379.510.236  The key section, 379.470, provides that 
MDI may reject premium rates only if: (1) premiums are excessive or 
inadequate, and (2) the market is no longer competitive.237  But while these 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra Parts III.B.1–III.B.2. 
 231. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 232. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 233. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 234. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 235. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 236. See generally MO. REV. STAT. §§ 379.420–379.510 (2000). 
 237. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.  MO. REV. STAT. § 379.470 provides: 
  (1) Rates shall not be excessive or inadequate . . . nor shall they be unfairly 
discriminatory. 
  (2) No rate shall be held to be excessive unless such rate is unreasonably high for the 
insurance provided and a reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area with 
respect to the classification to which such rate is applicable. 
  (3) No rate shall be held to be inadequate unless such rate is unreasonably low for the 
insurance provided and the continued use of such rate endangers the solvency of the 
insurer using the same, or unless such rate is unreasonably low for the insurance provided 
and the use of such rate by the insurer using same has, or if continued will have, the effect 
of destroying competition or creating a monopoly. 
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regulations give MDI the authority to reject premiums, MDI is unable to 
exercise this authority and regulate medical malpractice premiums for two 
reasons.  First, another state regulation allows policy forms, rating manuals, 
rating plans and modifications, to be filed ten days after their effective dates.238  
This regulation allows medical malpractice insurers to use new, higher 
premiums before filing with MDI—a system known as “use and file.”239  
Under such a “use and file” system, MDI is unable to approve or reject 
premium changes before the premiums are in use. 240 
Second, MDI has no power to enforce data reporting by insurers or require 
justifications for changes in premiums or loss estimates.  While MDI collects 
data reported by insurers pursuant to state law, this reporting requirement is 
voluntary, and MDI has no power to enforce the requirement with fines or 
penalties.241  Furthermore, the data that is reported is limited and does not 
include specific information on how insurers calculate premium increases.  
Without more specific data, MDI cannot determine if premiums are excessive 
or inadequate.  Moreover, no uniform method or standard exists in calculating 
premiums or estimating losses.  Without further data or regulatory standards, 
MDI cannot determine if premium increases or loss estimates are justified.  
Thus, MDI cannot exercise its authority to reject and regulate premiums. 
To correct these limitations, Missouri’s insurance regulations should be 
reformed.  The reforms should authorize MDI to: (1) reject excessive or 
inadequate medical malpractice insurance premiums, and (2) require insurers 
to justify premium changes.242  For MDI to exercise its power to reject 
premiums, Missouri’s current “use and file” system must be changed.  Insurers 
should no longer be permitted to file premium changes after using them in the 
market.  Instead, Missouri should adopt a “prior approval” system, so MDI can 
approve premiums before they are used in the market.  Under such a system, 
insurers should be required to submit a rate-change application for changes that 
exceed a certain percentage of last year’s premium.243 
Insurers would be required to provide specific data justifying the proposed 
premium changes in the applications.  MDI may call a public hearing regarding 
 
  (4) Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience within 
this state and consideration may also be given to past and prospective loss experience 
outside this state to the extent appropriate. . . . 
MO. REV. STAT. § 379.470 (2000). 
 238. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20 § 500–4.00(1)(b) (2000). 
 239. MDI 2002 REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. 
 240. Id. 
 241. MO. REV. STAT. § 383.115 (2000). 
 242. Regulatory changes similar to those discussed in this section are currently pending in 
Missouri’s Senate.  See S.B. 83, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2005). 
 243. Under such a scheme, relatively minor fluctuations in premiums would not be regulated. 
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these proposed premium changes.  If MDI does not approve the change, MDI 
should propose a reasonable rate based on the data provided. 
In addition to giving MDI “prior approval” power, the current reporting 
requirements should be expanded to require all medical malpractice insurers to 
report specific claims and loss for each medical specialty.  Insurers should 
include historical loss data supporting their loss estimates, and the data should 
be accompanied with a memorandum explaining the standard and methodology 
used in calculating loss estimates and premiums.  Insurers should file data 
projecting their earnings from premiums and investments that year and support 
this data with earnings from premiums and investments in years prior.  MDI 
should be given the power to promulgate rules setting forth standards for 
insurers in calculating loss estimates and premiums.244  MDI should also be 
able to enforce these reporting requirements through fines or other penalties. 
By giving MDI the power to reject and require justification for premium 
increases, MDI can ensure that savings from Missouri’s damage cap are passed 
on to physicians as lower premiums and prevent the current problem of high 
premiums despite low claims, payouts, and actual losses.  With stronger 
regulatory power and better data reporting, MDI can hold insurers accountable 
and provide greater transparency in the premium-setting process.  These 
changes would also help the industry predict and avoid dramatic changes in 
premiums due to investment cycles.  The next section looks to California, a 
state with both a non-economic damage cap and regulatory laws similar to 
those proposed here.  The experience of California shows why a damage cap is 
a limited solution that will not solve the problem of high medical malpractice 
insurance alone and why regulation needed. 
2. California: Caps and Regulation 
In 1975, California enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act 
(MICRA), which placed various restrictions on medical malpractice lawsuits, 
including a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages.245  Even though multiple 
caps were not permitted and the cap was set low, the price of physician 
premiums increased 450% over thirteen years, reaching an all-time high in 
1988.246  In 1988, in response to the ineffectiveness of the damage cap, 
 
 244. Given an increase in power for MDI, Missouri’s legislature should consider making the 
MDI Director an elected official.  Under current Missouri law, MDI’s director is appointed by the 
Governor.  Missouri Department of Insurance, MDI Administration, at http://insurance.mo.gov/ 
aboutMDI/admin.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2005). 
 245. Proposition 103: A Model for Insurance Regulation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Proposition 103 Hearings] 
(statement of Douglas Heller, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights). 
 246. FOUND. FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HOW INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED 
DOCTOR’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA AND HOW MALPRACTICE CAPS 
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Californians passed Proposition 103.247  Proposition 103 rolled back insurance 
rates by twenty percent and froze the premiums at that level for one year.248  In 
doing so, millions of dollars were refunded to doctors to compensate for 
excessive past premiums.249  Thereafter, medical malpractice insurance 
premiums were subject to a “prior approval” regulatory system.250  The 
regulations required medical malpractice insurers to justify rate increases or 
decreases with the Department of Insurance and gave the insurance 
commissioner the power to reject an insurer’s rate as too high or low at any 
time.251  After three years under Proposition 103, medical malpractice 
premiums fell twenty percent and remained stable, increasing at or below the 
level of inflation every year and falling two percent overall.252  The figure 
below illustrates the impact of the damage cap under MICRA and insurance 
regulation under Proposition 103 on California medical malpractice 
premiums.253 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAILED 1 (2003), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/rp/rp003103.pdf 
[hereinafter HOW INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTOR’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES]. 
 247. Id. at 2. 
 248. Id. at 1–2. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
 250. Id. 
 251. HOW INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTOR’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES, supra 
note 246, at 6. 
 252. Id. at 3. 
 253. Id. at 6 (using data provided by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners).  
The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (FTCR), is a nonprofit consumer watchdog, 
founded by the author of Proposition 103, Harvey Rosenfield.  The FTCR has conducted several 
studies evaluating the impact of California’s caps and regulations. 
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California’s experience shows that a cap alone will not solve the problem 
of high medical malpractice premiums.  Douglas Heller, an insurance specialist 
for the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, described the limits of 
the cap and the success of regulation in California, in testimony before the U.S. 
Senate.254  Mr. Heller testified: 
The flaw in the promise of tort restrictions is that it depends upon insurers to 
reduce rates without requiring the companies to do so. . . .  The insurance 
industry has invested millions of dollars to promote the notion that lawsuits are 
the sole barrier to affordable insurance, yet after the industry successfully 
shields itself from lawsuits, there is no commensurate rate decrease. 
  The lesson from decades of legislation restricting victims’ and consumers’ 
rights is that the insurance crises keep happening and rates continue to cycle 
higher and higher unless lawmakers address the real problem by regulating 
rates.255 
Missouri’s legislature should follow the example of California and 
strengthen the state’s insurance regulations.  With stronger regulations, MDI 
can ensure that savings from Missouri’s damage cap are passed onto 
physicians and that premiums remain low and stable in the future. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Missouri’s legislature is likely to pass reform of the state’s cap on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.  But such reform is a 
limited solution to the problem of high medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.  While a tighter cap will provide minimal savings for insurers, it 
does not guarantee that the savings will be passed onto physicians as lower 
premiums.  Thus, Missouri’s legislature should give MDI the power to reject 
excessive premiums and require justifications for premium changes.  By 
strengthening Missouri’s insurance regulations, MDI can ensure that savings 
from Missouri’s cap are passed onto physicians as low, stable premiums. 
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